Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood by Kendall, Sara & Nouwen, Sarah
6 KENDALL & NOUWEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014 11:32 AM 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES         
AT THE INTERNATIONAL          
CRIMINAL COURT:  
THE GAP BETWEEN JURIDIFIED AND 
ABSTRACT VICTIMHOOD 
SARA KENDALL*  
SARAH NOUWEN** 
They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.
1
 
Karl Marx 
I 
REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Representation is one of the most ingrained practices at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).2 ICC defense counsel engage in probably the best known 
practice of representation by directly representing the interests of the accused. 
But the prosecutor and the chambers also represent: The prosecutor prosecutes 
and the chambers adjudicate on behalf of—at minimum—all the states that 
have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute).3 If the court has jurisdiction over a situation pursuant to a UN Security 
Council referral, the prosecutor and chambers also act on behalf of all member 
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 1.  KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 124 (Foreign Languages 
Publishing House 1960) (1852). The Marx citation also appears as an epigraph to EDWARD W. SAID, 
ORIENTALISM (1979). 
 2.  In line with the approach of Jens Meierhenrich in this issue, see Jens Meierhenrich, The 
Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 1, 
10–27, the term “practice” is used as Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot used it in International 
Practices, 3 INT’LTHEORY 1, 4 (2011): “[P]ractices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in 
being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify 
background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.” 
 3.  Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 
July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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states of the United Nations. This article focuses on a more novel practice of 
representation in international criminal law: the practice of speaking, directly or 
indirectly, for victims of international crimes. 
Like other practices, the practice of representation produces effects.4 
Political and social theorists have studied the effects of the practice of political 
representation. As this article will show, some of their insights illustrate the 
effects of legal representation as well, despite formal differences in 
representational practice. One such insight is that, as Hanna Pitkin explains, 
representation is “re-presentation, a making present again” that is not merely a 
“literal bringing into presence” but a “making present in some sense of 
something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact.”5 For Pitkin, 
representational practice is characterized by the absence of the object of 
representation: Some other entity carries out this act of “making present,” 
introducing a rhetorical space where claims are made on behalf of absent 
constituents.6 In the field of law, practices of representation also allow various 
actors to stand in for others and to make claims on their behalf. Unlike the 
defendant, a disembodied concept such as “the state” or “the international 
community” is not physically present in the courtroom. 
When constituents are absent, representation produces what Pierre 
Bourdieu refers to as an “oracle effect”: A “spokesperson gives voice to the 
group in whose name he speaks, thereby speaking with all the authority of that 
elusive, absent phenomenon.”7 In politics, Bourdieu writes, a “whole series of 
symbolic effects . . . rest on this sort of usurpatory ventriloquism, which consists 
in giving voice to those in whose name one is authorized to speak.”8 The oracle 
effect that is produced through representational practices of speaking on behalf 
of others thus entails an appropriation or “usurpation” of the voices (and 
indeed authority) of the represented. This oracle effect is evident at the ICC as 
well. When the prosecutor prosecutes or the judges adjudicate international 
crimes—whether they do so on behalf of states that have ratified the Rome 
Statute, or on behalf of member states of the United Nations, or even on behalf 
of “the victims” of international crimes—these actors simultaneously “give 
voice to” and appropriate the voices and authority of those they claim to 
represent. 
But the relationship between the representative and the represented is more 
dynamic than one in which the representative merely usurps authority from the 
represented: The relationship is mutually constitutive. As Bourdieu argues, the 
representative is both constituted by and constitutes the represented group: “It 
is because the representative exists, because he represents (symbolic action), 
that the group that is represented and symbolized exists and that in return it 
 
 4.  See Meierhenrich, supra note 2, at 20–27. 
 5.  HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 8–9 (1967) (emphases omitted). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 211 (1991). 
 8.  Id. 
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gives existence to its representative as the representative of the group.”9 This 
circular relationship between representative and represented exists in law as 
well. While the representative relies upon the represented entity to confer the 
representative’s authority, the represented entity—whether a defendant, a 
victim, the crown, or the “international community”—relies upon the 
representative to make it present. 
As a practice, representation is thus built upon a series of presumptions 
about transferring authority from one individual (or collective) to another, 
about the ability to speak on behalf of others, and about the resilience of 
individual (and plural) interests when they are channelled through a singular 
representative. 
Against this theoretical background we review the representation of the 
interests of a new category of actors in international criminal law: “victims.”10 
According to the ICC website, the rights granted to victims under the Rome 
Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) are “[o]ne of 
the [ICC’s] great innovations.”11 Apart from the right to reparations (which is 
beyond the focus of this article), the website mentions the right to participate in 
proceedings: “For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, 
victims have the possibility . . . to present their views and observations before 
the Court. . . . The victim-based provisions within the [Rome] Statute provide 
victims with the opportunity to have their voices heard.”12 Similarly, a 
guidebook for victim participants in ICC proceedings explains: 
In order to ensure that the voices of victims are heard and their interests taken into 
account during proceedings, victims at the ICC enjoy rights that have never before 
been incorporated in the mandate of an international criminal court.
13
 
 
 9.  Id. at 204. 
 10.  The term “victims” is controversial, since it is associated with the image of a “powerless, 
helpless innocent” who suffers from catastrophic events but lacks agency him or herself. See MAKAU 
MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 11 (2002). In the specific context 
of the ICC, Adam Branch notes that the ICC’s model of “international human rights advocacy tries to 
reduce the survivor of violence to a victim.” See ADAM BRANCH, DISPLACING HUMAN RIGHTS: WAR 
AND INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 195 (2011). “Survivor” may indeed be a more 
appropriate term. For the purposes of this article the term “victims” is used nonetheless, since this is 
the term used in the Rome Statute and in the discourse of international criminal justice more broadly. 
One of the reasons for this usage may be that not all “victims” have in fact “survived” international 
crimes. Rule 85(a) of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines victims as “natural persons 
who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records, pt. II.A., 
ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE], available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Documents/ 
RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence). Rule 
85(b) also provides for recognition of organizations or institutions as victims. Id. 
 11.  Victims and Witnesses, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/0structure% 
20of%20the%20court/victims/Pages/victims%20and%20witnesses.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
GUIDE FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT 12, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8FF91A2C-5274-4DCB-9CCE-37273C5E9AB4/282477/160910 
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Legal scholars and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alike have 
welcomed the fact that the ICC statute allows for direct participation in the 
proceedings as a progressive step in international criminal law.14 The practices 
of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) 
were criticized for largely neglecting the interests of conflict-affected 
individuals.15 In ICTY and ICTR proceedings, as in common-law systems, 
victims had a role only as witnesses. Victims were thus juridically relevant only 
to the extent that they provided legally relevant information; they did not have 
a participatory role in their own right. By contrast, the ICC’s constituting 
document, the Rome Statute, was drafted to include a role in the proceedings 
for victims as victims. Recognized as “actors” in international criminal 
proceedings,16 victims became participants with interests to be represented. In 
 
VPRSBookletEnglish.pdf. 
 14.  See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 167–68 (1999) (claiming that victims of crimes under the Rome 
Statute are “central to the notion of international criminal justice” and that the relevant statutory 
article conferring their participatory rights “marks a great advance in international criminal 
procedure”); Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of 
Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004) (noting a 
“widespread assumption that victims either do or can benefit from participating in international 
criminal proceedings.”). For more critical readings, see Christine H. Chung, Victims’ Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L. 
HUM. RTS. 459 (2008), Håkan Friman, The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A 
Third Party to the Proceedings?, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 485 (2009), and Christine Van den Wyngaert, 
Victims before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge, 44 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 475 (2011). Christine Van den Wyngaert was an ICC judge when she wrote 
the article, id., and still serves as one, see Judge Christine Baroness Van den Wyngaert (Belgium), INT’L 
CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20 
judges/Pages/judge%20christine%20van%20den%20wyngaert%20_belgium_.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 
2014). For an example of NGO support for the inclusion of victim participants, see the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) page on the website of the Fédération international des ligues des droits de 
l’Homme, http://www.fidh.org/en/international-justice/international-criminal-court-icc/ (last visited Jan. 
20, 2014) (“The adoption of the Statute setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC), on 17 July 
1998, has been a historical step in the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes. For the first 
time, victims have the right to participate directly in international criminal proceedings.”). 
 15.  See, e.g., Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights and Interests in the International Criminal Court, in 
THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO 898, 898 (Jose Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 
2009) (observing that “the ICTY Statute and Rules place victims largely in an accessory role. As 
witnesses they serve the interests of criminal justice. Nevertheless the Rules related to restitution and 
compensation open up, albeit in a limited and embryonic fashion, a possibility for the Tribunal to assist 
the victims in obtaining reparation and justice for themselves. But it appears that these provisions were 
included in the Rules as a symbolic afterthought rather than that they were expected to produce 
concrete results”). Claude Jorda and Jerôme de Hemptinne note that the Rome Statute “appears to 
mark a new step forward . . . . [V]ictims are accorded the double status denied to them by the 
provisions setting up the ad hoc tribunals.” The Status and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1387–88 (Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002). 
 16.  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement at the Review Conference 
– General Debate 2 (May 31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/ 
Statements/ICC-RC-statements-LuisMorenoOcampo-ENG.pdf (“The Rome Statute established 
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theory, the counsel representing victims are granted a direct mandate from the 
victims to represent their interests at trial.17 
But the role of victims in the ICC’s representational practices goes beyond 
being represented in court proceedings. More indirectly and abstractly, actors 
both within and outside the ICC have invoked victims’ interests as a telos of the 
work of the ICC—sometimes together with other ends such as “the rule of law” 
or “ending impunity.” From within the ICC, the court’s first prosecutor once 
contended, “My mandate is justice; justice for the victims.”18 And at a press 
conference in Côte d’Ivoire, his successor claimed that she had opened an 
investigation in that country “for the victims – to give them a voice.” She added, 
“The sole raison d’être of the ICC’s activities in Côte d’Ivoire is the victims and 
the justice they deserve.”19 The court’s president has also suggested that victims 
are dependent on the court for redress, claiming that “[w]e must not let down 
the countless victims around the world that place their hope in this 
institution.”20 Furthermore, judges have invoked the interests of victims as a 
basis for their decisions. For instance, the appeals chamber rejected a 
defendant’s admissibility challenge, stating, 
This object and purpose of the Statute would come to naught were the said 
interpretation of article 17(1) of the Statute as proposed by the Appellant to 
prevail . . . . Impunity would persist unchecked and thousands of victims would be 
denied justice.
21
 
From outside the ICC, international civil servants supporting the court’s 
creation have claimed that victims’ interests are fundamental to the court’s 
work. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated at the beginning of the 
 
victims as actors of international justice.”). 
 17.  For an account of the system of victim representation at the ICC, see BRIANNE MCGONIGLE 
LEYH, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE? VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS (2011). 
 18.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia, ICC 
Press Release ICC-CPI-20080509-MA13 (May 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/Pages/press%20release%2
0media%20advisory_%20icc%20prosecutor%20visits%20egypt%20and%20saudi%20arabia.aspx 
[hereinafter Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia]. 
 19.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the Press by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 20 July 2013), ICC Press Release (July 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/ 
statement-otp-20-07-2013.aspx [hereinafter Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s 
Statement to the Press from Abidjan]. 
 20.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Launches Commemorations for 17 July – 
International Criminal Justice Day, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20120706-Pr822 (July 6, 2012), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news% 
20and%20highlights/Pages/pr822.aspx [hereinafter Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC 
Launches Commemorations for International Criminal Justice Day]. 
 21.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain 
Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the 
Case, Appeals Chamber Doc. No. 1497, ¶ 79 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc746819.pdf. By the authors’ request, the journal has agreed to deviate from conventional 
citation practice by including the names of issuing authorities and specific document numbers in 
citations to ICC cases. 
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negotiations on the Statute in Rome: “The overriding interest must be that of 
the victims, and of the international community as a whole.”22 International 
NGOs have also attempted to orient the project of the ICC around the interests 
of victims. As one international NGO stated at the occasion of the first 
conference for the review of the Rome Statute, 
One thing is very clear: victims want justice . . . . More than an abstract ideal, it is a 
very tangible means by which victims, communities and countries can regain 
confidence in their ability to live, and to live in peace. Their aspirations must be 
reflected in your discussions here . . . . We ask only that over the next couple of weeks 
you keep one picture at the forefront of your minds: the thousands of children, women 
and men who are victims of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, who have been 
disenfranchised and deprived of the right to live their lives in peace.
23
 
Addressing themselves to legal representatives of states, civil-society 
organizations such as this NGO argue that victims’ aspirations “must be 
reflected in your discussions here.” This imperative to represent or stand in for 
the figure of the absent victim permeates the discourse of those who “practice” 
international criminal law—whether as lawyers, diplomats or activists—both 
within and outside the court. 
Academic commentary on the ICC has reinforced this imperative, with 
international legal scholars arguing that victims are the proper beneficiaries of 
the ICC’s work. For example, an established international criminal law scholar 
noted, 
The Conference Chair and leadership of the Assembly of States Parties have a 
daunting task before them to . . . emerge from Kampala with a Court that is 
strengthened rather than weakened by the difficult conversations that will need to 
take place on the shores of Lake Victoria. Let us hope, for the sake of the victims, that 
they are able to do so.
24
 
Much academic commentary on the court presumes that the court is—or ought 
to be—animated by and attentive to the interests of victims, in whose name the 
court is often said to act or speak. 
All of these actors within and outside the ICC claim that victims are 
represented through its work. Depending on the position of the speaking 
subject—whether the prosecutor, the judges, civil-society organizations, or 
academic commentators—the court’s representative relationship to victims is 
taken to be either a descriptive fact or a normative assertion. Victims are 
 
 22.  Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of 
International Criminal Court Conference Must Be That of Victims and World Community as a Whole, 
U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6597 L/2871 (June 15, 1998) [hereinafter Press Release, Secretary-General, 
UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court Conference Must 
Be That of Victims and World Community as a Whole]. 
 23.  Niccolò Figà-Talamanca, Secretary General, No Peace Without Justice, Statement of No 
Peace Without Justice: Review Conference of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
(May 31, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.npwj.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
NFT_Statement_ICCReviewConference_01JUN10.pdf). 
 24.  Leila N. Sadat, On the Shores of Lake Victoria: Africa and the Review Conference for the 
International Criminal Court 16–17 (Washington Univ. in St. Louis, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
10-06-04, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626323. 
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represented directly, as particular individuals with a name (or, as is usually the 
case in ICC proceedings, a pseudonym) and indirectly, rhetorically, as the 
raison d’être of the International Criminal Court. 
This article focuses on these two practices of victim representation: the 
representation of victims as participants in ICC trials, and the discursive 
invocation of victims as the telos of the court’s work. These two practices lead 
in different directions. The former leads to the “juridification” of victimhood: 
the legal categorization of victims. The application of legal rules to all actual 
victims results in a narrowing, like a pyramid, of the victims that are considered 
“legally relevant.” The latter, namely that of abstract representation, draws out 
victimhood from all victims—dead or alive, past, present, or future—and 
consolidates this as one. The result of the abstract representation is the creation 
of a deity-like and seemingly sovereign entity, “The Victim,” which transcends 
all actual victims and corresponds to no individual victims in their particularity. 
This figure of “The Victim” is deployed as a kind of new sovereign of 
international criminal law, yet its looming presence in the discourse surrounding 
the work of the ICC overstates the role of actual victims within the legal 
proceedings.  
II 
“JURIDIFIED VICTIMHOOD”—NARROWING THE PYRAMID 
Thinking outside the frame of international criminal law, millions if not 
billions of people have reason to consider themselves victims, individually or as 
part of a group. They are victimized by poverty, family abuse, hunger, floods, 
diseases, human-rights violations, financial crises, armed conflict, and 
inequality. If victimhood is conceptualized as a pyramid, this broad category of 
individuals who have suffered would form its base. 
However, victimhood as a legal category—juridified victimhood—is much 
narrower than that massive base. The legal process narrows the category of 
legally “recognized” victims. Legal parameters give the pyramid of juridified 
victimhood its shape. The first substantial narrowing occurs because not all 
causes of victimhood are recognized as international crimes, let alone crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Financial crises, malaria, and poverty, for 
instance, transform billions of individuals into some form of victim. For a 
number of reasons, including complex chains of causation, these events hardly 
ever lead to individual criminal responsibility or to a role for these victims in 
international criminal proceedings. Indeed, even clear human-rights violations, 
such as abhorrent living conditions in camps for internally displaced people, are 
not categorized as international crimes, and these victims thus remain 
unrecognized within the frame of international criminal law. Even in cases of 
armed conflict, only very few victims of that conflict will be recognized as 
victims in international criminal law: Victims of physical violence, and in some 
cases their relatives, could be recognized; victims of the situation of war 
“alone”—who live in camps for displaced persons, experiencing a lack of food 
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and opportunities—do not qualify, because their predicament is not recognized 
as an “international crime.” 
Recognition by law determines which voices are heard in the courtroom and 
which are not. For instance, in the first situation referred to the ICC, that of 
northern Uganda, the court recognized some victims of physical violence25 but 
did not recognize individuals who had “only” suffered from the conditions 
produced by more than two decades of conflict. As it happens, many of the 
unrecognized victims were initially opposed to the ICC’s intervention because 
of the negative consequences they thought it would have for any future peace 
process.26 In the courtroom, however, only the opinions of those victims who 
had registered for participation in the ICC proceedings, and were therefore 
(tacitly) in favor of ICC proceedings, received recognition.27 Consequently, only 
the voices of individuals who support the ICC process and who have sometimes 
quite literally been “bought into” it, with intermediaries presenting the prospect 
of reparations, are heard as emanating from legally recognized victims.28 Victims 
of crimes outside the vocabulary of international criminal law are excluded 
from participation, as are those who oppose the ICC process as a means of 
redressing their suffering. The selection reflects what Balakrishnan Rajagopal 
 
 25.  Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on 
Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Pre-Trial Chamber II Doc. No. 252 (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc311910.pdf. 
 26.  See, e.g., Lucy Hovil & Zachary Lomo, Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 
2000: The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation 20 (Refugee Law Project, 
Working Paper No. 15, 2005), available at http://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/working_papers/ 
RLP.WP15.pdf. 
 27.  See, e.g., Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Observations on Behalf 
of Victims Pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Rome Statute with 55 Public Annexes and 45 Redacted 
Annexes, Pre-Trial Chamber II Doc. No. 349 (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc589023.pdf. 
 28.  In the ICC’s Darfur situation, Sudanese citizens who disagreed with the ICC’s proceedings 
hired lawyers to represent them as amicus curiae, who sometimes were allowed to make submissions, 
see, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Decision on Application Under Rule 103, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 185 (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc627395.pdf, and 
sometimes not, see, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Decision on the Filing of 
Annex 4 to the Application Under Rule 103, Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 224 (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc689806.pdf. In the northern Uganda situation, a delegation of 
critical Ugandans visited the court and was received by the Registry and Office of the Prosecutor, but 
they did not have legal standing. Their views were also largely ignored: Although the Acholi leaders 
asked the Office of the Prosecutor to be mindful of the peace process and dialogue, the Office of the 
Prosecutor issued arrest warrants three months later. See Press Release, Registrar, Delegation from 
Uganda Holds Talks with the Registrar of the ICC, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20050318-94 (Mar. 16, 
2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200204/press%20releases/Pages/delegation%20from%20uganda%20holds%20talks
%20with%20the%20registrar%20of%20the%20icc.aspx; see also Press Release, Office of the 
Prosecutor, Statements by ICC Chief Prosecutor and the Visiting Delegation of Acholi Leaders from 
Northern Uganda, ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-20050318-95 (Mar. 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/ 
press%20releases/Pages/statements%20by%20icc%20chief%20prosecutor%20and%20the%20visiting
%20delegation%20of%20acholi%20leaders.aspx. 
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might describe as the “somewhat tragic reality that resistance must work, to 
some extent, within the parameters established by that which is being 
resisted.”29 
Further narrowing of the pyramid of legally “relevant” victims occurs as a 
result of the Office of the Prosecutor’s selection of situations in which it opens 
investigations.30 This selection is partially dependent on whether the UN 
Security Council uses its power to refer situations concerning states that are not 
parties to the statute. But with respect to the 122 States Parties to the statute, 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) can use its own initiative to open an 
investigation provided that the pre-trial chamber approves.31 As a result of the 
OTP’s selection thus far, some victims in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Kenya, among others, have been able to obtain legal recognition; victims in 
Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia have not. 
Once a situation has been selected, the temporal, geographical, and personal 
parameters of the situation further narrow the pyramid of recognized victims. 
Thus, as a result of the court’s temporal jurisdiction, victims of crimes 
committed before 2002—when the statute entered into force—will generally not 
be recognized as victims.32 The temporal jurisdiction can be even more limited 
in a given situation.33 For instance, a report from the ICC’s Victims Participation 
 
 29.  BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 10 (2003). 
 30.  In the situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber I made the 
following distinction between situations and cases: 
Situations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial, and in some cases 
personal parameters, such as the situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo since 1 July 2002, entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether 
a particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as 
such. Cases, which comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects, 
entail proceedings that take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear. 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the Applications 
for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Pre-
Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 101-tEN-Corr, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc183441.pdf (citations omitted). A victim can be recognized as a victim in a situation or as a victim in 
a case or both. Only case victims can participate in proceedings during the trial phase. 
 31.  See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 15. 
 32.  Victims of continuing crimes are a possible exception. Discrimination between victims on the 
ground of the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction occurs not only in legal proceedings, but also in academic 
work. One edited volume on the ICC’s complementarity principle, for instance, states in its opening 
pages, “[t]his book is dedicated to all those victims who suffered harm from mass atrocities since the 
entry into force of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.” Dedication, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
(Carsten Stahn & Mohamed El Zeidy eds., 2011). 
 33.  The temporal jurisdiction has implications for victims beyond participation. For instance, the 
Trust Fund for Victims, created pursuant to article 79 of the Rome Statute, supra note 3, provides 
assistance only to victims of crimes committed within the temporal jurisdiction of the court. In northern 
Uganda this has meant that victims of mutilations allegedly committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army 
after July 2002 qualified for surgical assistance and victims of such mutilations prior to that date did 
not. Interview by Sarah Nouwen with field program officer, Trust Fund for Victims, Int’l Criminal 
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and Reparations Section (VPRS) concerning the Kenyan situation notes that a 
“range of self-characterized ‘victim’ or ‘survivor’ populations exist, including 
many who suffered harm as a result of periods of violence which fall outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”34 The VPRS nonetheless focuses its attention “on 
those victim populations who appear to have suffered harm due to [the] 
political violence of 2007–2008,”35 a period that falls within the jurisdiction of 
the court.36 
Geographically the prosecutor’s selection of situations has an impact on who 
can be recognized as a victim. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for 
instance, the OTP has opened investigations in only a few regions. Victims in 
other areas of the country cannot be legally recognized as victims in ICC 
proceedings unless another investigation is opened or the scope of an existing 
investigation is expanded. Common references to “Congolese victims” as a 
general category conceal the court’s narrow geographical gaze. 
Whether victims can be legally recognized as such also depends on which 
group or groups the OTP investigates. In northern Uganda, for instance, some 
victims of crimes allegedly committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army can be 
legally recognized. Victims of crimes allegedly committed by the Ugandan 
armed forces cannot, however, because the OTP has not opened an 
investigation into the forces’ actions during the conflict.37 
The pyramid narrows further when the OTP decides to bring a case: Only 
victims of the prosecutor’s specific charges (a specific act at a specific time at a 
specific location) can be recognized as participants in the proceedings. Thus, 
victims of the charged crimes—for example, children recruited as child soldiers 
or peacekeepers in a camp under attack—can be recognized, but victims of 
crimes not charged—such as victims of crimes committed by child soldiers or 
villagers outside the camp—cannot.38 The charges limit not merely the acts—for 
instance, killing, rape, or the recruitment of child soldiers—of which people can 
be recognized as victims, but also the events (acts at a particular time in a 
 
Court, in Gulu, Uganda (Sept. 2008). 
 34.  Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Public Redacted Version of Report 
Concerning Victims’ Representations (ICC-01/09-6-Conf-Exp) and annexes 2 to 10, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II Doc. No. 6-Red, ¶ 21 (May 29, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc853213.pdf. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II Doc. No. 19 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc854562.pdf (authorizing an investigation in relation to crimes against humanity within the 
jurisdiction of the court committed between June 1, 2005 and November 26, 2009). 
 37.  For an account of the political dimensions of these decisions, see BRANCH, supra note 10, at 
179–215. 
 38.  See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals of the 
Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 
2008, Appeals Chamber Doc. No. 1432, ¶¶ 40–66 (July 11, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc529076.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Public Redacted Version 
of “Decision on the 52 Applications the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case,” Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 
147-Red, ¶¶ 130–41 (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ iccdocs/doc/doc758050.pdf. 
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particular place). Speaking on behalf of former child soldiers that he was 
appointed to represent, a lawyer in Prosecutor v. Katanga observed that victims 
“still do not understand why only one event has led to charges. I have met with 
dozens of victims, and many wonder why other events were deemed to be not 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”39 
As with the prosecutor, the judges can also narrow the pyramid. One 
instance in which they do so is when they decide, in accordance with the 
evidentiary standard, that the prosecutor has not provided sufficient evidence to 
confirm the charges. In the Kenyan situation, for example, the judges’ refusal to 
confirm charges against the sole person accused of the particular crimes of 
police violence—the former commissioner of police—meant that victims of 
police violence lost their juridical status as victims in the case.40 (They could 
remain victims in the situation.)41 
Not only substantive criteria but also procedural requirements narrow the 
pyramid. Victims who meet all of the material conditions may still not be legally 
recognized as victims because they are unaware of their eligibility to apply for 
victim participation or do not manage to meet the procedural conditions.42 For 
instance, the application forms—available for download on the court’s website 
in English and French, the court’s two working languages—are seven pages 
long and considerably complex.43 They are not easily accessible to people 
without internet access or reading skills, and they require supplemental 
identifying documents that can be difficult and costly to obtain. At a seemingly 
most practical, but in fact most existential level, applying for participation 
 
 39.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Transcript of Trial Hearing, Doc. No. T-80-
ENG, 42:23–25 (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc785434.pdf (statement of Jean-
Luis Gilissen, legal representative of child soldier victims, in translation from French). 
 40.  Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II Doc. No. 
382-Red (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf (refusing to confirm charges 
against former Commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali). Victims lost their status in the case because 
there were no other individuals accused of the same crimes against whom the charges were confirmed. 
Id. By contrast, in the Darfur situation the court refused to confirm the charges against Bahar Idriss 
Abu Garda, Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 243-Red (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc819602.pdf, but did confirm the same charges against Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh 
Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Prosecutor v. Banda, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the 
“Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 121-Corr-Red (Mar. 7, 
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1036947.pdf. 
 41.  For the difference between a “situation” and a “case,” see supra note 30. 
 42.  For example, the head of the VPRS has noted the “many practical and logistical 
considerations” that affect victim participation, including the challenge of “how to inform victims about 
the ICC in general as well as about their own possible role as participants.” See Fiona McKay, Victim 
Participation in Proceedings before the International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring/Summer 
2008, at 2, 4. 
 43.  For the English version, see INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, APPLICATION FORM FOR 
INDIVIDUALS: REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDINGS AND REPARATIONS AT THE ICC FOR 
INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/48A75CF0-E38E-48A7-A9E0-
026ADD32553D/0/SAFIndividualEng.pdf. 
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requires energy and time, resources that those victims who struggle for survival 
on a day-to-day basis often cannot spare. As one report on obstacles to 
participation asks rhetorically, 
The question is: how will victims be able to participate in the proceedings before the 
ICC while their basic needs such as housing and medical assistance remain unmet? Is 
the participation of victims in the process meaningful if their dignity is not first 
restored and their social and economic rights upheld? Indeed, how will victims be able 
to participate in a meaningful manner if they continue to eke out a meagre existence 
almost five years after the violence ended?
44
 
Even those victims who do manage to fill out application forms and to 
provide identifying documents do not necessarily obtain recognition. In the 
confirmation-of-charges hearing for Callixte Mbarushimana, the judges ruled 
that the applications of 470 victims would be left out because the Registry did 
not have the resources to process them by the deadline.45 Furthermore, in some 
situations, the court requires individuals who have been granted victim status at 
one stage of the proceedings to apply again for victim status at later stages. In 
sum, from the perspective of conflict-affected individuals seeking recognition as 
juridical agents, obtaining victim status at the ICC can be complex, time 
consuming, and tenuous. 
The narrowing of the victim pyramid is not only a vertical dynamic. Its width 
fluctuates with changing case law. The drafters of the Rome Statute left much of 
the legal framework governing victim participation to be determined by ICC 
judges. The key article of the Rome Statute, article 68(3), establishes that 
“[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall 
permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court,” leaving individual 
chambers to decide when personal interests are affected, what constitutes views 
and concerns, and at what point victims may participate. The degree of 
permissiveness has varied over time and across chambers. In the early stages of 
the court’s lifespan, a pre-trial chamber permitted general participation by 
victims at the investigation stage,46 but this right was then restricted on appeal.47 
 
 44.  ANUSHKA SEHMI, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH TRUTH & JUSTICE, A LUXURY VICTIMS 
CANNOT AFFORD: MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 5 
(2013), available at http://www.africog.org/sites/default/files/A%20Luxury%20Victims%20Cannot% 
20Afford%20-%20KPTJ%20JULY%202013.pdf. 
 45.  Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision Requesting the Parties to 
Submit Observations on 124 Applications for Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I Doc. No. 265, 6 (July 4, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1103372.pdf. 
 46.  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and 
VPRS 6, Pre-Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 101-tEN-Corr, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc183441.pdf. 
 47.  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on Victim 
Participation in the Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, Appeals Chamber Doc. 
No. 556 (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc612293.pdf. 
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Participatory rights at the trial stage have varied as well. One of the trial 
chambers granted victim status to “victim[s] of any crime falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”48 This meant that in effect even victims of crimes not 
charged in the case under consideration could participate in the trial, thus 
broadening the pyramid. The court’s appeals chamber overturned this broad 
grant of participatory rights, however, by claiming that the harm and the 
concept of personal interests under article 68(3) of the statute must be linked 
with the charges against the accused.49 This decision again narrowed the scope 
of possible victim participants at trial. 
Finally, even recognized victims are sometimes unable to practice their 
participatory rights because the court is unable to obtain the relevant suspect. 
Victims in the Ugandan context have faced this circumstance. They enjoy 
formal status before the court, but because the defendant members of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army have not been arrested, the victims’ substantive 
participatory rights have been deferred.50 
Even when recognized and able to exercise the right to participate, victims 
are still represented by counsel, references to victims as “participants” or even 
“actors” in the context of the ICC notwithstanding.51 As one trial chamber judge 
observed, 
It needs to be remembered that this is a court of law and, in particular, this is the 
criminal trial of the accused, and the presumption is that those who participate in the 
proceedings will be lawyers, lawyers acting for individuals or for bodies, for entities.
52
 
While representational practices generally involve “making present in some 
sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact,”53 this is 
particularly so with victims before the ICC. Although a given victim’s 
relationship with counsel is sometimes described as an “attorney–client” 
 
 48.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Victims’ Participation, Trial 
Chamber I Doc. No. 1119, ¶¶ 93, 95 (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc409168.pdf 
(interpreting the scope of rule 85). 
 49.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the 
Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Appeals 
Chamber Doc. No. 1432, ¶¶ 40–66 (July 11, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc529076.pdf. 
 50.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision 
on Legal Representation of Victims a/0065/06, a/0066/06, a/0068/06, a/0088/06, a/0090/06 to a/0096/06, 
a/0098/06, a/0102/06, a/0103/06, a/0112/06, a/0115/06, a/0117/06, a/0118/06, a/0120/06 to a/0126/06, 
a/0076/07 to a/0078/07, a/0081/07, a/0082/07, a/0084/07, a/0085/07, a/0090/07 to a/0103/07, a/105/07 to 
a/0108/07, a/0112/07, a/0115/07, a/0117/07, a/0118/07 and a/0123/07, Pre-Trial Chamber II Doc. No. 336 
(Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc629125.pdf. 
 51.  See Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., May 17–28, 2004, Regulations of 
the Court, ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf; see 
also Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 16. 
 52.  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript of 
Status Conference, Doc. No. T-101-ENG, 43:11–14 (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc617156.pdf (statement of Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford). 
 53.  See PITKIN, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
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relationship,54 structural constraints often dilute this relationship. First, victims 
do not have an unqualified right to have their own individual attorney.55 The 
chamber can ask them to be represented by common legal representatives,56 
who typically represent between hundreds and thousands of individuals.57 
Second, geographical separation weakens the relationship between the victim 
and the counsel. Victims have few opportunities for direct contact with their 
representatives, who are often based in The Hague and rarely go on “missions” 
to “the field.”58 Some common legal representatives have their own “field 
assistants” who act as a channel of communication between them and the 
victims. While establishing a connection between the victim and the courtroom, 
the field assistant acts as another link in the chain of representation. In this 
sense, the victim is thus not represented but re-represented. 
The relationship between victims and counsel also changes as a result of 
evolving case law. For instance, the trial chamber in the Kenyan cases presumed 
that victims’ interests would be better represented if the common legal 
representative was based in Kenya as opposed to in The Hague, arguing that 
“greater geographic proximity between victims and the Common Legal 
Representative is important to ensure that victims can communicate easily and 
personally with their representative and thus ensure meaningful 
 
 54.  Interview by Sara Kendall & Chris Tenove with field assistants of the common legal 
representative in Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang (Kenya I) and Kenya II, Int’l Criminal Court (July 25, 
2012). 
 55.  Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Common Legal Representation 
for the Purpose of Trial, Trial Chamber III Doc. No. 1005, ¶ 16 (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc965368.pdf (“[C]ommon legal representatives are chosen by the Court, as opposed to by 
the victims themselves.”). 
 56.  See Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 10, at r. 90(2)–(3); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on Victims’ Participation and Victims’ Common Legal 
Representation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, Trial 
Chamber V Doc. No. 498 (June 4, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1423293.pdf; Kenya II, 
Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
Doc. No. 138, ¶ 20 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387.PDF. 
 57.  According to a 2012 report on the court’s activities, there were twenty-four external common 
legal representatives in eleven teams working on behalf of victims. The report claims that the court’s 
own internal Office of Public Counsel for Victims represented approximately 4000 victims in 2012, with 
the number of victims represented by that office increasing by nearly seventy percent that year. Int’l 
Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Report on the Activities of the 
Court, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/21 (Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, Report on the 
Activities of the Court], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-21-
ENG.pdf. At the time of writing, the number of recognized victim participants in the Bemba case in the 
situation of the Central African Republic exceeded 5000; meanwhile the Registry has been instructed 
by the trial chamber to appoint two common legal representatives to “represent the totality of victims 
to be allowed to participate in the trial.” Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Common 
Legal Representation for the Purpose of Trial, Trial Chamber III Doc. No. 1005, ¶ 7 (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc965368. At present, recognized victims in other cases number in 
the hundreds. 
 58.  Even when representatives travel to “the field,” victims may not be able to meet with them on 
account of lacking the means to cover the costs of transport to the meeting or the time off work. See 
SEHMI, supra note 44. 
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representation.”59 Although the decision narrows the geographical distance 
between the representative and the victims, it also increases the distance 
between the representative and the court: When the common legal 
representative is based on site, he or she in turn is generally represented in the 
courtroom by the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV). In this 
scenario, the OPCV is not directly representing victims, but is “acting on the 
Common Legal Representative’s behalf.”60 The links in the chain have been 
reshuffled, but the re-representation continues. 
At the same time, the trial chamber’s decision enhanced access for victims 
(and reduced the workload for judges) by dropping the requirement that 
victims apply to the court for victim status and then be vetted judicially. Only 
victims who wish to appear directly before the chamber still need to fill out 
participation forms. Others may be “registered” as victim participants with the 
ICC Registry, which will enter their details into a database.61 However, what is 
gained in access may be lost in meaning. Registration is easier than applying for 
status as a victim participant, but registration itself appears to be more a gesture 
of identification than an act leading to tangible outcomes. These “registered” 
victims are not officially granted victim status by the court. Instead, they 
become part of an amorphous category of victims whose views can be presented 
 
 59.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ¶ 
59, Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 498 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387.PDF; 
see also Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 460, ¶¶ 29, 60 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1479374.pdf. Changes in the victim-representation regime were largely inspired by practical reasons. 
The Kenya I decision notes that 
[i]n the present case, due to the number of charges and the widespread nature of the alleged 
crimes, the number of eligible victims is estimated to be in the thousands. If all victims were 
required to comply with the procedure set out in Rule 89 of the Rules, for practical reasons it 
would not be possible to process all of the applications before the start of the trial, scheduled 
for April 2013. 
Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, Trial 
Chamber V Doc. No. 460, Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 460, ¶ 30 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1479374.pdf. 
 60. Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 460, ¶ 41 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479374.pdf. 
The decision continues, “The OPCV’s primary responsibility will be to act as the interface between the 
Common Legal Representative and the Chamber in day-to-day proceedings. To that end, the OPCV 
will be allowed to attend hearings on behalf of the Common Legal Representative.” Id. ¶ 43. The 
common legal representative may appear for opening and closing statements and may request 
appearances at other points during the trial proceedings. Id. ¶ 71. 
 61.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 498, ¶¶ 24, 48 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387; 
see also Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 460, ¶¶ 25, 49 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1479374.pdf. According to one staff member of the VPRS, however, the term “register” is 
problematic given the broader context of “registrations” that victims of the 2007 and 2008 postelection 
violence had been asked to participate in, including for the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission of Kenya. The staff member was also concerned that the term implied reparations and 
compensation, and elected to use the term “verification” instead. Interview by Sara Kendall with staff 
member, Victims Participation & Reparations Section, Int’l Criminal Court (Mar. 4, 2013). 
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according to the discretion of their common legal representative.62 As the trial 
chamber noted, “while it is practically impossible to represent the individual 
views and concerns of thousands of victims, it is possible to represent their 
interests by voicing their shared legal and factual concerns in the present 
proceedings.”63 The chamber thus tasks the common legal representative with 
distilling generalizable “interests” from the more unwieldy and personal “views 
and concerns” to which article 68(3) of the Rome Statute refers.64 Streamlining 
the practice of victim representation thus also produces the “oracle effect” of 
representation identified by Bourdieu: When appearing on behalf of absent 
constituents—the victims of a particular case—the representative “gives voice” 
to an abstract collectivity.65 
Under this modified set of representational practices, the legal 
representative in fact has considerable discretion. When distilling generalizable 
“interests,” the legal representative filters, weighs, and selects possibly 
diverging views. The legal representative could decide to reveal differences of 
opinion among victims, but in doing so, he or she risks working against some of 
the interests of individual victims.66 In Bruno Latour’s terminology, legal 
representatives thus act as “mediators” and not as “intermediaries”: Rather 
than merely channelling views, the legal representatives “transform, translate, 
distort, and modify that meaning of the elements they are supposed to carry.”67 
The legal representative’s discretion is enhanced by the trial chamber’s 
decision that the abstract collectivity of victims that the representative 
represents extends beyond the registered victims. In the chamber’s words, 
[T]he Chamber decides that the views and concerns of victims who choose not to 
register or who are, for practical or security reasons barred from doing so, shall 
nevertheless be voiced, in a general way, through common legal representation. . . . 
During the trial phase all victims, regardless of whether they have registered or not, 
will be represented through common legal representation.
68
 
 
 
 62.  For example, a submission from a common legal representative on where the trials should take 
place―in either The Hague, Arusha, or in Kenya―presented the different views of part of his pool of 
represented victims, but he advocated for a different location than the majority of those surveyed. 
Kenya I, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Common Legal Representative for Victims’ Observations in 
Relation to the “Joint Defence Application for Change of Place Where the Court Shall Sit for Trial,”  
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 620 (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1556944.pdf. 
 63.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 498, ¶ 59 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387.PDF. 
 64.  See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 68(3). 
 65.  See BOURDIEU, supra note 7. 
 66.  One common legal representative recounted that the common legal representatives needed 
clarification regarding the extent of their mandate due to the diversity of interests among the 
populations they represent, where sometimes their interests may be conflicting. Interview by Sara 
Kendall with common legal representative, Int’l Criminal Court (Mar. 1, 2013). 
 67.  BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-
THEORY 39 (2005). 
 68.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, 
Trial Chamber V Doc. No. 498, ¶ 52 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387.PDF. 
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This decision appears to leave no opt-out procedure for victims who choose not 
to be represented, or indeed, for victims who explicitly state a desire to 
withdraw from ICC proceedings because they have no “confidence that the 
process would be beneficial to them,” as did a large number of court-recognized 
victim participants in one of the Kenyan cases.69 Without a legal avenue for 
resisting representation as part of an abstract collectivity, even victims who do 
not want to have anything to do with the ICC can thus be “symbolically” “made 
present” in a case before the court.70 In the words of the chamber, “[A]ll 
victims . . . will be represented.”71 
At the apex of the pyramid of juridified victimhood are the victims who wish 
to present their views and concerns individually by appearing directly before 
the chamber and have passed through the vetting process of the court with its 
attendant participation forms and application deadlines, submissions by the 
parties and rulings by the judges, and who have an accused in the dock. Having 
reached the summit, however, the “participating” victim in fact often has quite 
an inactive role.72 Direct participation is exceptionally rare. As one trial 
chamber judge explains, 
If individuals are allowed to participate in person, there would have to be cogent, 
indeed powerful, reasons for that exceptional course . . . because . . . people without 
legal training coming to talk about very difficult things that have happened to them 
could have a real capacity for destabilising these court proceedings . . . . So we’re not 
saying no, but we’re saying exceptional and for good reason.
73
 
Indeed, the number of victim participants who, once channeled through the 
institutional machinery of the court, directly address a chamber of the ICC is 
remarkably low. One victim was permitted to present views before the appeals 
chamber in an appeal in the Uganda situation.74 Three individual victims were 
permitted to testify in Prosecutor v. Lubanga; their testimony was subsequently 
dismissed as unreliable.75 In the Katanga trial, the chamber authorized four 
individuals out of a group of over 300 recognized victims to appear before the 
 
 69.  Isaiah Lucheli, Ninety Three Post Election Violence Victims Withdraw From International 
Criminal Court Proceedings, STANDARD DIGITAL (June 7, 2013), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 
?articleID=2000085360&story_title=93-pev-victims-withdraw-from-icc-proceedings (Kenya). 
 70.  See BOURDIEU, supra note 7; PITKIN, supra note 5. 
 71.  See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 72.  An independent report on victim participation at the ICC noted that “[g]enuine concerns . . . 
exist that participation is currently not meaningful for victims who are accepted to participate,” and 
elaborated that victim participants were unable “to present their views at appropriate stages.” 
INDEPENDENT PANEL OF EXPERTS REPORT ON VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 39 (2013), available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/ 
130711%20panel%20report%20FINALfor%20dissemination.pdf. 
 73.  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript of 
Status Conference, 43:15–44:3 (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc617156.pdf 
(statement of Presiding Judge Adrian Fulford). 
 74.  Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the 
Participation of Victims in the Appeal (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc580160.pdf. 
 75.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ¶ 499 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
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court;76 however, two of them were considered unreliable before they even 
came to The Hague.77 In the Bemba trial, a total of five individuals out of over 
5000 recognized victims have appeared to date.78 
Ultimately, even for those victims who participate, their status always 
remains merely provisional. This is because judges recognize victims before any 
alleged facts have been proven. There cannot be definite victims of unproven 
acts; therefore, victim recognition is necessarily provisional. In the case of an 
acquittal, victims will lose their victim status (unless there are coaccused, 
charged with the same crimes and incidents). But even in the case of a 
conviction, victims’ position as victims will seldom be confirmed in the 
judgment: The judgment focuses on the guilt of the accused and need not 
determine the relationship between the accused and the participating victims. 
Perhaps it is only in the subsequent reparations proceedings that victims can 
be considered to obtain final recognition. However, this decision is not 
dependent on the victims’ participation in the trial: Victims can also apply for 
reparations without participating. Contrary to the widespread rhetoric of 
victims gaining “recognition” through the ICC, victims thus never receive 
recognition as participants in the proceedings in a strict judicial sense. Moreover, 
even in the reparation procedures, victims may not obtain final judicial 
recognition of individual victimhood. In the court’s first decision on victims’ 
reparations, the judges established only the principles; they left it up to the 
Trust Fund for Victims, a nonjudicial body, to grant reparations accordingly.79 
Of the millions of victims in the world, then, only thousands have managed 
to reach the top of the pyramid of juridified victimhood and have been granted 
provisional recognition as victims before the ICC. To date only a handful of 
these have been permitted to speak directly in ICC proceedings. The remainder 
are “made present” through the work of their legal representatives. Through 
the “oracle effect” of representational practice, these individuals are constituted 
as a group to be spoken for, and in turn their spokesperson (and indeed the 
court itself) appropriates the “authority of that elusive, absent phenomenon.”80 
 
 76.  As of October 2012, the Katanga case had 366 recognized victims. Int’l Criminal Court, Report 
on the Activities of the Court, supra note 57, at pt. IV. 
 77.  Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ¶ 32 (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1579080.pdf. On February 21, 2011, 
the chamber heard testimony of the remaining two victim participants. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/12, Transcript of Trial Hearing (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1245216.pdf. 
 78.  Two individuals appeared in person in May 2012; three more testified in June 2012 via video-
link. 
 79.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to 
be Applied to Reparations, Trial Chamber I Doc. No. 2904 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf. 
 80.  BOURDIEU, supra note 7, at 211. 
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III 
TRANSCENDING THE PYRAMID—”THE VICTIMS” AS ABSTRACTION 
Practices of victim representation are not confined to the courtroom. 
Outside the courtroom, victims are also represented—and at an even greater 
degree of abstraction—by diplomats, politicians, ICC officials, NGOs, 
journalists, and scholars. Discursively, victims are presented as the raison d’être 
of the ICC.81 Indeed, victims are figured as animating and giving purpose to the 
entire machinery of international criminal accountability: Even international 
criminal tribunals that do not have a practice of victim participation have 
invoked victims as one of the justifications for their work.82 References to 
victims serve as reminders of this group’s seemingly fundamental position in 
international criminal law regardless of whether they hold a position as 
participant. 
However, the fact that victims have also been invoked by tribunals that do 
not have a practice of victim participation shows that the invocation of victims 
as the justification of the international–criminal law project is not necessarily a 
reference to the victims that participate in courtroom proceedings. The rhetoric 
of the role of the victim in the ICC transcends legally recognized victims. 
Indeed it transcends actual victims with their individuated harms and suffering. 
The “victims”—whom the court’s first prosecutor referred to when he said that 
his mandate was “justice for the victims,”83 whom the next prosecutor called to 
mind when she pronounced that the “sole raison d’être of the ICC’s activities in 
Côte d’Ivoire is the victims,”84 whom the court’s president brought up when he 
made an appeal not to “let down the countless victims around the world that 
place their hope in this institution,”85 whom the appeals chamber invoked when 
referring to “thousands of victims,”86 whom Kofi Annan mentioned when 
speaking of the “overriding interest . . . of the victims,”87 whom NGOs rely on 
when stating that “victims want justice” and when evoking an image of 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Visits Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, supra note 18; Silvana Arbia, Registrar, Int’l Criminal Court, Remarks to the 11th Session of 
the Assembly of States Parties (Nov. 4, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/F1E2BCA9-4F55-4C1C-938B-2107233D0A98/0/ASP11OpeningREGSA1ENG.pdf). 
 82.  Victims’ interests were not, however, the rationale for international criminal law in its early 
stages of development. See Conor McCarthy, Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: 
Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of Justice?, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 351, 352 (2012). 
 83.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Visits Egypt and Saudi Arabia, supra 
note 18. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s Statement to the Press from Abidjan, 
supra note 19. 
 86.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Launches Commemorations for International 
Criminal Justice Day, supra note 20. 
 87.  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain 
Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the 
Case, Appeals Chamber Doc. No. 1497, ¶ 79 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc746819.pdf. 
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“thousands of children, women and men who are victims of crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction,”88 and, finally, for whose “sake” legal scholars hope the 
court will act89—are not specific individuals. Instead, in these contexts, “the 
victims” is a reference to an abstraction—”The Victims”—which is based on the 
idea of victims. Grammatically plural but treated as singular, this abstraction in 
fact effaces individuality and transforms victims into a homogenous unity, like 
“the masses,” “the general will,” or “the people.” In the words of Bourdieu, this 
constitution of a unified figure is “an act of magic which enables what was 
merely a collection of several persons, a series of juxtaposed individuals, to exist 
in the form of a fictitious person, a corporatio, a body, a mystical body 
incarnated in a social body, which itself transcends the biological bodies which 
compose it.”90 
As abstraction, “The Victims” acts in some ways as the absent “sovereign” 
of international criminal law. In the field of public international law, which 
lacks its own sovereign, “The Victims” appears rhetorically as the one in whose 
name criminal justice is exercised. Like national prosecutions carried out on 
behalf of the crown or the state, the ICC is said to speak on behalf of the victims 
of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”91 “The 
Victims” thus seems to serve as the highest symbolic entity within this juridical 
domain, in whose name justice is done. Yet as with nationalist symbols such as 
tombs of the Unknown Soldier—which, as Benedict Anderson observes, are 
revered “precisely because they are either deliberately empty or no one knows 
who lies inside them”92—“The Victims” does not correspond to a concrete, 
material referent. It stands for collective suffering produced through 
international crimes without containing the particular suffering of wronged 
individuals. 
Like a sovereign, “The Victims” as an abstraction hovers over and above, 
but is not part of, the pyramid of victimhood. “The Victims,” as opposed to 
individual victims, also enjoys immunity from challenge. Challenging the 
suffering of any individual is difficult since suffering is inherently personal.93 But 
it is even more difficult to challenge the suffering of an abstract entity such as 
“The Victims” because that suffering is an amalgamation of individual pain that 
cannot be traced to a single individual. This collective suffering has been 
experienced by all victims together, while no single individual has experienced 
 
 88.  Press Release, Secretary-General, UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of 
International Criminal Court Conference Must Be That of Victims and World Community as a Whole, 
supra note 22. 
 89.  Niccolò Figà-Talamanca, supra note 23. 
 90.  BOURDIEU, supra note 7, at 208. 
 91. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
 92.  BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 9 (1991). 
 93.  See Ian Buruma, The Joys and Perils of Victimhood, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 8, 1999, available 
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1999/apr/08/the-joys-and-perils-of-victimhood/; Martha 
Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1436–38 (1993). 
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it all. Consequently, the suffering of “The Victims” cannot be questioned, nor 
can claims made on its behalf be contested by the concrete particularity of 
individual experience: “The Victims” is untouchable. 
The untouchable authority of “The Victims” is sometimes invoked to shield 
the court from criticism. For example, in response to the growing claim that the 
ICC has been selectively targeting the African continent in prosecuting 
individuals for international crimes, the current prosecutor has stated, 
[i]f we are thinking about the victims of these crimes, the victims of these atrocities 
who are also vulnerable African victims, then we would not think about targeting 
Africans. We will be thinking about, working for and supporting the victims of these 
crimes.
94
 
The moral currency of victimhood is thus appropriated to shore up the 
legitimacy of the ICC’s actions.95 In line with Bourdieu’s analysis of 
representative practice, although “The Victims” does not exist without being 
discursively represented as such, “The Victims” does confer authority on those 
who claim to represent it. 
“The Victims” is a convenient telos for the ICC not only because third 
parties cannot impeach an organization that represents the interests of “The 
Victims,” but also because “The Victims” themselves cannot impeach the 
representative: An abstraction cannot speak back. In the event that specific 
victims disagree with the justice conducted in their name—for instance, as with 
the Kenyan victims mentioned above—the abstraction of “The Victims” serves 
as a reservoir of other victims who could be said to wait for the court’s 
intervention. Victims silenced by death provide an inexhaustible justification of 
the ICC as a retributive mechanism. Potential future victims, in turn, will 
continue to justify the ICC as a means for deterring harm yet to come. In their 
absence, dead or future victims are paradoxically made present: they have been 
there and they will be there to be spoken for. As such, they are always available 
for invocation as the underlying purpose of the project, without threatening 
resistance or articulating other desires.96 
Although “The Victims” is seemingly sovereign in a symbolic register, as 
when crimes are prosecuted on behalf of the crown, the abstraction does not 
actually exercise power itself. Instead it works as a placeholder for the agency of 
others: The rhetoric of “The Victims” presents victims not only as the 
underlying justification of the international criminal legal order, but also, as 
Kamari Clarke has argued, as a helpless and potential beneficiary of 
 
 94.  Peter Clottey, ICC Prosecutor Hails US International Justice Role, VOICE OF AM. (Apr. 4, 
2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/icc-prosecutor-hails-us-international-justice-role/1635160.html; 
see also Victims Must Not Be Forgotten on International Justice Day: Civil Society Underlines Hope for 
Victims of Grave Crimes That Rome Statute System Represents, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=8758bcde31bc78a5c32ceee50&id=0233ef45b6&e=24df3e19c0. 
 95.  See Ann Sagan, African Criminals/African Victims: The Institutionalised Production of Cultural 
Narratives in International Criminal Law, 39 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 3, 12 (2010). 
 96.  S.M.H. Nouwen, Justifying Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 327, 340 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
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international criminal law that requires a subject—the agents of this field—to 
act for it and in its name.97 Presumptively new agents in international criminal 
law, victims are thus in fact dependent on the agency of a representative, both 
inside and outside the courtroom. 
Those who work in and around the court are presented by the field of 
international criminal law as the field’s actual agents. They consider themselves 
part of another abstraction: the “international community.” The very grammar 
of common descriptions of the ICC’s work suggests that justice is carried out in 
the name of “The Victims” by the “international community.” “The Victims” 
thus appears as the passive object of an active subject. That subject is as abstract 
as its object: The boundaries of the “international community” are 
indeterminate, but whatever is within is presented as homogeneous, creating an 
impression of consensus among members of this discursively constituted 
“community.” The OTP invokes and claims to represent the interests of both 
abstractions—“The Victims” and the “international community”—yet it 
belongs only to the latter. Speaking in the name of “The Victims” on behalf of 
the “international community,” the OTP thus enjoys the rhetorical force of a 
double abstraction, wielding the power of both pathos and universal consensus. 
This practice of representing abstractions is not so much a reflection of 
realities as it is constitutive of them. The “making present” of an acting 
“international community” helps to shape and construct an “international 
community” with an ability to act. The “making present” of victims as helpless, 
by contrast, reinforces passivity and dependence.98 The agency of “the 
international community” is constructed in response to and as the mirror image 
of the helplessness of “The Victims.” For instance, when the ICC prosecutor 
announced the opening of an investigation into Mali, she stated: 
My Office . . . will bring justice to Malian victims by investigating who are the most 
responsible for these alleged crimes . . . . There is still turmoil in North Mali and 
populations there continue to be at risk of yet more violence and suffering . . . . Justice 
can play its part in supporting the joint efforts of the ECOWAS, the AU and the 
entire international community to stop the violence and restore peace to the region.
99
 
Even when deciding to drop charges against an accused,100 as a result of which 
specific victims would lose their status as participants in a case before the ICC, 
 
 97.  Kamari M. Clarke, Global Justice, Local Controversies: The International Criminal Court and 
the Sovereignty of Victims, in PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 134 (Tobias Keller & Marie-Bénédicte Dembour eds., 2007) [hereinafter Clarke, Global 
Justice]; see also KAMARI M. CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE ICC AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2009) [hereinafter CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE]. 
 98.  MUTUA, supra note 10, at 27–38; see also Clarke, Global Justice, supra note 97. 
 99.  Press Release, Office of Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor Opens Investigation into War Crimes in 
Mali: “The Legal Requirements Have Been Met. We Will Investigate,” ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-
20130116-PR869 (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr869.aspx. 
 100.  Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges 
against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Office of the Prosecutor Doc. No. 687 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1565549.pdf. 
6 KENDALL & NOUWEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:32 AM 
Nos. 3 & 4 2013] REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES 257 
the ICC prosecutor emphatically reiterated her commitment to the victims and 
stressed her own memory of them as a form of agency: 
[L]et me remind you all of my unwavering commitment to justice for the victims of the 
2007-2008 post-election violence. The real victims of the terrible violence in Kenya 
five years ago are the men, the women, and the children, who were killed, injured, 
raped, or forcibly displaced from their homes - and whose voices must not be 
forgotten. I will not forget them.
101
 
As this quote reveals, the practice of representing victims as objects of the 
agency of heroic interveners occurs in a discourse that is not purely legal or 
technical: As Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham have argued, it involves a 
degree of pathos and melodrama.102 The melodramatic representation of victims 
replaces their actual experience with “a cheap and ghastly imitation,” 
exaggerating the relevant “plot” and “characters” in order to appeal to the 
observer’s emotions.103 At the same time, those acting in the name of victims 
“represent” themselves as a heroic and powerful substitute, as “the holder of 
those values which the victim lacks.”104 “I am doing justice for you,” the court’s 
first prosecutor said to the people of northern Uganda.105 Rather than a position 
of empathy, the actor occupies a pleasurable position of compassion or even 
heroism, reimagining the world and the actor’s own agency within it.106 As the 
first prosecutor recounts, 
One of my investigators from Portugal interviewed a girl who was abducted when she 
was 11-years-old but later escaped. After 3 days, when the investigator had finished 
asking the questions the girls started to cry. My investigator felt bad. But the girl said: 
“Don’t worry, I am not sad. I am crying because this is the happiest moment of my 
life. I have never had anyone pay such attention to what happened to me.” What we 
are doing is helping the victims to be less of victims and more of citizens. It is my legal 
duty to grant such people justice.
107
 
Melodramatic in that it exaggerates the characters of the hero and the victim, 
this quote also reveals the circular relationship of representation that Bourdieu 
pointed to: The representative, the one who speaks on behalf of, is also 
dependent upon the authority conferred by the represented to speak in their 
 
 101.  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to 
Withdraw Charges against Mr Muthaura, ICC Press Release (Mar. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/OTP-statement-
11-03-2013.aspx. 
 102.  SUSAN MARKS & ANDREW CLAPHAM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 405 
(2005); see also ROBERT MEISTER, AFTER EVIL: A POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 72 (2011). 
 103.  MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 102. 
 104.  Anne Orford, Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 679, 699 (1999); see also Clarke, Global Justice, supra note 97. 
 105.  Felix Osike, Uganda: Kony Must Face Trial [at] ICC, NEW VISION (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/575670 (Uganda). 
 106.  See Robert Meister’s critique of what he terms “humanitarian compassion”: “[I]t makes us feel 
good about feeling bad, creating the delusion that compassion is its own reward.” MEISTER, supra note 
102, at 73. On heroism, see MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 102, at 404. See also Clarke, Global 
Justice, supra note 97. 
 107.  Felix Osike, Uganda: ICC Prosecutor L[]uis Ocampo in His Office at the Hague, NEW VISION 
(July 13, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200707160105.html (Uganda). 
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name. The heroic actor on behalf of the international community needs 
victims—or indeed “The Victims”—to exist and to continue to exist in order to 
justify the work of international criminal law. 
The mutual dependence inherent in this circular relationship of 
representation in some instances creates a system of checks. This could be the 
case, as Bourdieu explains, when power is conferred from one person to 
another.108 Or, to put it in terms of legal representation, the more direct the 
mandate of representation, the stronger the check on the power of the 
representative. When the representative speaks on behalf of a collectivity, 
however, “that person can be invested with a power which transcends each of 
the individuals who delegate him,”109 introducing a transcendent power into 
representational practice that is greater than the sum of the represented 
individuals. The check that the represented could theoretically exercise on the 
power of the representative is then operable only if the represented “can stand 
up and say ‘you are not the group.’”110 In the context of ICC proceedings, 
exercising a check on the powers of those who discursively represent the victims 
is virtually impossible when represented individuals are increasingly displaced 
by the collective fiction of “The Victims,” a fiction that cannot respond to 
claims made in its name. 
The convenience of “The Victims,” this figure that cannot contest its own 
representation, reveals what Bourdieu terms “the oracle effect,” when a 
representative “gives voice to the group in whose name he speaks, thereby 
speaking with all the authority of that elusive, absent phenomenon.”111 “The 
Victims” is not sufficiently tangible to contest the representative practices that 
are undertaken on its behalf. And yet as a rhetorical construct, this entity 
continues to provide a ready justification for the work of the ICC. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the frequent invocation of victims as actors, it has proven difficult to 
grant individual victims a place in the process of international criminal law. 
First, as the chambers have realized,112 there are many victims of international 
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crimes. This has raised numerous managerial and financial problems in the 
current procedural setup.113 More fundamentally, as Martti Koskenniemi has 
observed concerning the role of the victim in the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, the victim is considered “worthy of humanitarian support as long 
as he remains a helpless victim – but turns into a danger the moment he seeks to 
liberate himself.”114 As individual human beings, victims (in sharp contrast to 
“The Victims”) are inherently political persons. As a political person—with 
interests and relationships and strategies—a victim carries a political narrative 
of the past and a vision for the future that may fit uneasily in the courtroom 
process, and indeed in the project of international criminal law more broadly. 
Victims as political persons may even oppose the use of international criminal 
law in response to the harms they have suffered, preferring other solutions to 
conflicts and alternate avenues of redress.115 
One of the most common discursive practices for dealing with the 
complexities of the individual victim has been that of abstraction: to refer to 
“The Victims” collectively as opposed to specific victims. In this practice, the 
figure of “The Victims” has emerged as a seemingly sovereign placeholder of 
international criminal law. “The Victims” suggests a symbolic unity and 
authority, not unlike that other abstraction, “the international community,” in 
whose name international criminal law is ostensibly carried out. It is also an 
authority that cannot be challenged because victims’ experiences of suffering 
cannot be contested. As an abstraction, however, “The Victims” cannot call to 
account those who act in its name. International criminal law is thus carried out 
in the name of two abstractions, neither of which (unlike the state) has legal 
personality and neither of which can hold those who claim to represent it to 
account. 
“The Victims” as an abstraction serves the project of international criminal 
law—itself a field that often disavows its own political origins and 
consequences116—more effectively than individual victims, with their particular 
circumstances, interests, and views of what justice ought to be. As an 
abstraction, “The Victims” can always be crafted as a mirror image: as the 
innocent mirror image of the criminal (for instance, the child soldiers vis-à-vis 
Lubanga),117 as the helpless mirror image of international actors who must act in 
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its name (for instance, the women, children, elderly, and men, victimized in the 
past or future, who presumably depend on NGOs and international courts to 
receive justice), and as the passive mirror image of an “international 
community” that is discursively constituted to act on its behalf. Commentators 
within and outside the legal community may have been inclined to disregard 
sweeping statements concerning “the victims” as the triumphalist language of 
diplomats and activists. However, dismissing this kind of representation because 
it is legally irrelevant fails to acknowledge that the invocation of “the victims” 
has become routinized in the discourse of the ICC. Indeed, it has become a 
regular practice. And, like other practices, practices of representing victims 
before the ICC are consequential. Both the representation of victim 
participants in courtroom proceedings and the discursive representation of 
“The Victims” are practices that generate conceptions, produce effects, and not 
only challenge but also sustain structures of power.  
Insofar as practices amount to implementation of preconceived ideas—as is 
the case with laws—they are also “constitutive of social reality.”118 The practices 
of victim representation constitute social reality in at least three ways. First, 
these practices reinscribe the court’s own authority through recourse to a 
presumptive set of constituents, namely the victims of crimes within its 
jurisdiction, who are to be represented through the ICC’s work. The 2002 entry 
into force of the Rome Statute may serve as the ICC’s original constitutive act, 
but its authority is continuously reconstituted through ritualized practices. As 
Davide Nicolini has observed, institutions are “kept in existence through the 
recurrent performance of material activities, and to a large extent they only 
exist as long as those activities are performed.”119 Through its practices the ICC 
and its proponents continue to invoke the interests of victims as a basis of the 
court’s activity and as a justification in the face of criticism. 
Secondly, ICC representative practices generate and reinforce the idea of 
“The Victims,” fostering particular conceptions of an individual’s lived reality, 
forms of suffering, and desires for redress.120 This idea, in turn, has imperative 
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force: Implemented by the world’s only permanent international criminal court 
and the influential epistemic community surrounding it, the idea of “The 
Victims” becomes a governing paradigm for how survivors of mass-atrocity 
crimes ought to articulate their suffering. Indeed, as the above statement from 
an international NGO asserts, recognition by the ICC is regarded as a means 
through which victims “can regain confidence in their ability to live.”121 Put 
another way, in the words of the court’s first prosecutor, “What we are doing is 
helping the victims to be less of victims and more of citizens.”122 This idea of 
conflict survivors as passive figures requiring ICC intervention has become 
commonplace among those who advocate on behalf of victims: 
For victims, a case before the ICC means that the international community hears their 
suffering, and cares enough to ensure that those responsible for their pain will not go 
unpunished . . . . Being an integral part of the process is also the first step towards 
giving victims back the dignity they had lost through these crimes.
123
 
As it is presented in these statements, representation before the ICC enables 
individuals to regain their confidence, citizenship, and dignity—fundamental 
qualities that have presumably been lost, and that an entity such as the court 
can presumably recover. Presumptions aside, seeking redress through 
recognition by an entity such as the court is beset by the limitations and 
exclusions illustrated through the narrowing of the pyramid of juridified 
victimhood. 
A third result of these practices is that actual victims are depoliticized.124 
Disavowing the political aspects of victims’ identities suppresses the extent to 
which survivors are actors with initiative and interests.125 Particularly, the 
practice of abstracting victimhood serves to suppress the victim’s political 
interests. The more abstract the victim, the less political and thus the more 
suitable to international criminal law. Thus “The Victims”—as an abstraction 
that cannot speak back—is a safe and available substitute for actual victims in 
the discourse of international criminal law. Meanwhile, leaving agency to those 
who purport to represent victims enhances these agents’ own resources, power, 
and status. The increasing gap between the discourse and reality of victim 
participation is thus also an increasing gap between those who represent and 
those who are represented. 
In sum, in the practices of the ICC—which in this context involves not 
merely the court, but also the epistemic community surrounding it—victims are 
both overdetermined and less represented than the claims suggest. They are 
overdetermined in that all victims are amalgamated into an abstract entity, 
“The Victims,” which serves as a rhetorical justification and rationalization of 
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the project of international criminal law. Meanwhile, as a result of juridification, 
very few individuals are actually personally represented in legal proceedings. 
This gap between the discourse surrounding victim representation and what 
transpires in the court’s work—namely between the presentation of “The 
Victims” as the raison d’être of international criminal law and the very limited 
role of victims in international criminal proceedings—coincides with a gap 
between the victim as an abstraction and as an actual victim of mass atrocity. 
Kamari Clarke explains this dynamic in recounting how victims are 
paradoxically central as well as marginal: “[I]nstitutions such as the 
International Criminal Court actually draw their power from the imaginary of 
the victim, whose liberation is possible only through suffering; the victim figure 
thus remains both central and marginal to the process.”126 The overdetermined 
presence of the figure of “The Victims” as a rhetorical construct obscures the 
representative challenges faced by conflict-affected individuals in accessing the 
form of justice that is practiced in their (abstract) name. And yet, even though 
an ICC trial chamber seems to have adjusted the promise of participation to a 
more modest reality,127 the discourse produced through agents acting on victims’ 
behalf continues to portray “The Victims” as the telos of international criminal 
law. 
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